COMMENTS OF THE CENTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES
ON THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ORDER
REGARDING THE MONITORING OF LAWYER-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS
66 FED. REG. 55062 (Oct. 31, 2001)


In October, the Attorney General issued an order authorizing the Justice Department to monitor conversations between certain individuals being detained by the government and their lawyers. 66 FED. REG. 55062 (Oct 31, 2001). While the number of detainees so far affected by the order may be small, the effect on those detainees is dramatic and damaging. The monitoring scheme authorized by this order radically undermines the confidential lawyer-client relationship of those affected, so much so that it violates the detainees' First Amendment right to access the courts and their Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The monitoring scheme lacks the strict procedural protections for the attorney-client relationship required by the common law and the Constitution. In addition, it violates federal wiretapping statutes and the Fourth Amendment.

I. The monitoring scheme interferes with and undermines the lawyer-client relationship.

A client's ability to consult a lawyer in confidence is at the heart of the lawyer-client relationship. A lawyer needs to be able to assure her client of confidentiality in order to induce the client to be candid. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 407 (1998) ("Knowing that communications will remain confidential . . . encourages the client to communicate fully and frankly with counsel."). Candid disclosure, in turn, is necessary for the lawyer to be able to adequately represent the client. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) ("[S]ound legal advice or advocacy . . . depends upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the client."). A client who knows that his conversation with a lawyer is being monitored by a third party (let alone by the government that is detaining him) will hesitate to speak candidly with his lawyer. This monitoring will have a chilling effect on those communications. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554 n. 4 (1977) (noting "the inhibition of free exchanges between defendant and counsel because of the fear of being overheard.").


In addition, the order's effect on attorney-client privilege will cause the ethical lawyer to advise her client against the kind of disclosure that is necessary for adequate representation. The attorney-client privilege attaches to a communication between a client and his lawyer only if the communication occurs in confidence - i.e., outside the hearing of others. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS§ 68(3) ("RESTATEMENT") . Where a lawyer and client have a conversation knowing that a third party can hear them, the privilege does not apply. Suburban Sew 'N Sweep v. Swiss-Bernina, 91 F.R.D. 254, 258 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (collecting cases); RESTATEMENT § 71 Illustration 2 (attorney-client privilege does not prevent testimony by nonsurreptitious eavesdropper who overheard lawyer-client conversation in courthouse hallway). Ironically, the order's provision requiring that the detainee and his lawyer be informed of the monitoring extinguishes the privilege for any conversations that occur under such circumstances.

A lawyer has an ethical obligation to conduct her communications with a client in a way that preserves attorney-client privilege. RESTATEMENT § 60 Comment d. Since the order prevents attorney-client privilege from attaching to any of these conversations, here a lawyer must caution the detainee against candid disclosure. A lawyer representing a detainee will be hobbled by this inability to obtain necessary information, and it may be impossible for the lawyer adequately to represent the detainee at all. See Memorandum from Paul Carrington et al. to John Ashcroft et al. on Government Monitoring of Attorney-Client Communications (submitted Dec. 4, 2001) ("Law Professors' Comments") § I, p. 4

The regime established by this order cuts to the very heart of the lawyer-client relationship. It cripples the detainee's ability to consult meaningfully with her lawyer. This interference with the lawyer-client relationship, in turn, violates detainees' First and Sixth Amendment rights.

II. This monitoring scheme violates detainees' First Amendment right to petition the government and access the courts.

All persons, including those being detained, have a First Amendment right to petition the government. This right includes the right to access courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). For court access to be meaningful, the detainee must be able to consult a lawyer. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). Federal courts have consistently ruled that detainees must be able to consult their lawyers in confidence. Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 631 (7th Cir. 1973) ("[E]ffective protection of access to counsel requires that the traditional privacy of the lawyer-client relationship be implemented in the prison context.") See Comments of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers on the Attorney General's Order (submitted Dec. 20, 2001)("NACDL Comments"), § I; Comments of the American Civil Liberties Union.

This monitoring, with its inevitable chilling effect on lawyer-client communications, constitutes a serious interference with the right of detainees to access the courts, and thus violates the First Amendment.

III. This monitoring scheme violates prisoners' Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.


The Sixth Amendment guarantees that a person facing criminal charges has a right to effective assistance of counsel. That assistance can be effective only if the client can consult the lawyer in a meaningful fashion, and provide the lawyer with necessary information. This order will have a chilling effect on a prisoner's communications with his lawyer, thereby interfering with a prisoner's ability to consult his lawyer and obtain effective assistance of counsel. The "'Sixth Amendment's assistance-of-counsel guarantee can be meaningfully implemented only if a criminal defendant knows that his communications with his attorney are private . . . .'" Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554 n.4 (1977) (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae). See Law Professors' Comments § I.

The regulation's attempt to limit this interference -- by establishing monitoring teams who do not participate in the prosecution -- is completely ineffective, and appears to conflate prisoners' Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. The Sixth Amendment issue is not whether a prisoner's statements to his lawyer will be used against the prisoner at trial, which might implicate a prisoner's Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, modified 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The Sixth Amendment issue is whether the monitoring scheme interferes with the prisoner-lawyer relationship in such a way as to deprive the prisoner of the ability to consult meaningfully and obtain the effective assistance of a lawyer. While taint teams might cure a Fifth Amendment problem, they do nothing to cure the Sixth Amendment problem - the chilling effect of such monitoring on a lawyer-client communications.

IV. The monitoring scheme lacks the necessary procedural protections required before any interference with the lawyer-client relationship.

The lawyer-client relationship is so fundamental to the protection of constitutional rights that the government must meet strict procedural requirements before it can interfere with that relationship. Before it can undertake a search of lawyer's office, the government must convince a neutral magistrate of probable cause. Klitzman, Klitzman and Gallagher v. Krut, 744 F.2d 955 (3d Cir. 1984) (With regard to searches of law offices, courts should "scrutinize carefully the particularity and breadth of the warrant authorizing the search, the nature and scope of the search, and any resulting seizure."). The government cannot unilaterally interfere with lawyer-client confidentiality. Instead, it must present evidence and convince a neutral judge that such interference is appropriate. "[T]hose charged with [the] investigative and prosecutorial duty should not be the sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing their tasks." United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972).

Even outside the search-and-seizure context, courts impose strict procedural requirements to protect lawyer-client confidentiality. For example, before a court will pierce the attorney-client privilege using the crime-fraud exception, the party seeking to pierce the privilege must present to a court sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that in camera review of the material will show that the client was using the lawyer in a crime or fraud. Zolin v. United States, 491 U.S. 554 (1989).


This order, allowing the Attorney General to undermine a detainee's relationship with his lawyer without first going before any neutral decision-maker, is inconsistent with both the common law of attorney-client privilege and the Constitution's requirement of due process. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974). ("The constitutional guarantee of due process of law has as a corollary the requirement that prisoners be afforded access to the courts in order to challenge unlawful convictions and to seek redress for violations of their constitutional rights. This means that inmates must have a reasonable opportunity to seek and receive the assistance of attorneys."). See NACDL Comments § III.

V. The monitoring scheme violates the federal wiretapping statutes and the Fourth Amendment.

Congress carefully balanced the law enforcement interest in obtaining information against the public interest in ensuring privacy when it passed and later revised the federal wiretapping statutes, 18 U.S.C. Sections 2510-2522. Before the government can intercept oral communications, it must demonstrate to a federal judge probable cause to believe both that a particular individual is committing a crime, and that the individual will be communicating about that crime. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3). Congress has set out a limited number of crimes for which such interception is permitted. 18 U.S.C. § 2516. It has limited such interception to a thirty-day period. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5). Congress even provided for emergency situations involving national security or the imminent threat of serious bodily injury. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7). In other words, while Congress has recognized that law enforcement has a legitimate need to eavesdrop on some conversations, the potential for abuse of eavesdropping is so great that it has imposed significant procedural requirements and restrictions.

This order attempts to circumvent the wiretapping statutes' procedural requirements and restrictions by informing detainees and their lawyers that their conversations will be monitored. 29 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)(2). The wiretapping statutes apply to "oral communication," which is defined as that "uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2). Since both the lawyer and detainee know about the monitoring, the argument might go, they can no longer have a reasonable expectation that their "communication is not subject to interception." But this argument fails because a detainee and his lawyer have no choice but to communicate. They have a right rooted in the First and Sixth Amendments to communicate in confidence.

In this order, the government seems to substitute notice of eavesdropping for the warrant and probable cause required by the Fourth Amendment. If notice could substitute, then by the same logic the government could simply inform the general public that all their telephone and other conversations may be monitored. Such a policy would, of course, be unconstitutional. Under the Fourth Amendment, the government cannot monitor the conversations between a detainee and his lawyer unless it goes before a neutral magistrate and proves probable cause.


Conclusion

This regulation interferes with the lawyer-client relationship of detainees so fundamentally that it violates their First and Sixth Amendment rights. It is contrary to the constitutional and common law requirements that the executive branch obtain the approval of a neutral magistrate before interfering with lawyer-client confidentiality. It violates the wiretapping statute and the Fourth Amendment. This regulation should be withdrawn.

written by: Prof. Kathleen Clark
Washington University School of Law
St.
Louis, MO 63130
314-935-4081
kathleen@wulaw.wustl.edu

for: Center for National Security Studies
2130 H Street, N.W. Suite 701
Washington, D.C. 20037

202-994-7060
cnss@gwu.edu

submitted: December 31, 2001